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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this slip and fall case alleging negligence for failing to 
clear snow and ice from a sidewalk, the district court 
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granted summary judgment to defendants, holding plaintiff 
assumed the risk of injury. Plaintiff appeals. We will reverse 
and remand. 
 
I. 
 
On March 13, 1993, Philadelphia was hit with a major 
snow storm. Levick Street in Northeast Philadelphia was 
plowed, creating mounds of snow along the border of the 
street and sidewalk that remained for days. On the morning 
of March 22, 1993, plaintiff Judith Kaplan (age 30) and 
three others were waiting at a bus stop on the Levick Street 
sidewalk, near the intersection with Oxford Avenue, in 
order to catch SEPTA's route 26 bus. As the bus pulled up 
to its designated stop, a snow mound approximately three 
to four feet high stood between the passengers and the bus. 
It appears the snow mound began on the sidewalk and 
extended two or three feet into the street. 
 
The passengers decided to climb the mound to board the 
bus. A 63 year old woman boarded with obvious difficulty, 
being helped by two men to traverse the slope. After the 
older woman successfully negotiated the snow mound, one 
of the men turned to warn Kaplan that the mound was 
"icy." Kaplan tried to climb the mound, but when she 
reached the top of the slope she slipped and fell and broke 
her tibia and fibula. 
 
There was another route to the bus, although it was 
longer and involved walking in the street. The snow mound 
extended along the street, but there was a gap next to a fire 
hydrant located less than a block away. Much of the 
sidewalk was clear of snow and ice. Therefore, the snow 
mound could have been avoided by walking a distance 
along the sidewalk to the fire hydrant, entering Levick 
street at that point, and then walking back up the street to 
the bus. 
 
Kaplan filed this personal injury suit in the Court of 
Common Pleas for Philadelphia County against defendant 
Exxon Corporation, which owns the property adjacent to 
the sidewalk where she fell. She alleges her injuries were 
caused by Exxon's negligent failure to keep the sidewalk 
free of ice and snow. Kaplan's husband also sued for loss 
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of consortium. Exxon removed the case to federal court and 
joined as third party defendants James J. Anderson 
Construction Co., Inc. and James D. Morrissey, Inc., 
allegedly the owners and operators of the snow plows that 
plowed Levick Street. 
 
Exxon filed for summary judgment on two grounds: (i) 
that Kaplan assumed the risk of walking across the snow 
mound; and (ii) that Kaplan slipped on the street, not the 
sidewalk. The district court granted Exxon's motion on the 
first ground, finding Kaplan voluntarily confronted a known 
and obvious danger when she climbed the mound of ice 
and snow. The court denied Exxon's motion on the second 
ground, finding an issue of fact on the location of the snow 
mound. The district court then granted summary judgment 
in favor of the third-party defendants "upon consideration 
of the[ir] Motion[s] for Summary Judgment . . . and, in light 
of this Court's Grant of Summary Judgment in favor of 
Exxon Corp." 
 
II. 
 
The district court had removal jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1441(a) based on diversity of the parties. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review the district 
court's grant of summary judgment under a plenary 
standard. City of Erie, PA v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 109 
F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1997). We must apply the same test 
as the district court and affirm only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); City of 
Erie, PA, 109 F.3d at 159. 
 
III. 
 
A. Assumption of Risk 
 
The district court held Kaplan assumed the risk of injury 
as a matter of law, because she voluntarily confronted a 
known and obvious danger when she climbed the snow 
mound. The district court held that under Pennsylvania 
law, "when `an invitee enters business premises, discovers 
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dangerous conditions which are both obvious and 
avoidable, and nevertheless proceeds voluntarily to 
encounter them' the landowner is under no duty to protect 
against those risks." Kaplan v. Exxon Corp., 926 F. Supp. 
59, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 
A.2d 120, 125 (Pa. 1983)). Noting it was uncontroverted 
that Kaplan was told the mound was "icy" and that she had 
observed the older woman cross the mound with difficulty, 
the district court found the danger was "known and 
obvious." Kaplan, 926 F. Supp. at 62. 
 
The district court also held Kaplan voluntarily confronted 
the danger because there was clear and level access to 
Levick Street by a fire hydrant halfway down the block 
where the snow mound had been cleared. Finding that 
Kaplan could have avoided climbing the snow mound, the 
court also found that her fear that she might miss the bus 
if she took the longer route did not justify her conduct. 
 Kaplan contends that under Pennsylvania law the issue 
of assumption of risk is normally for the jury. She 
maintains there are genuine issues of fact whether she 
knew the snow mound was dangerous and whether her 
actions were voluntary. Specifically, Kaplan contends she 
did not know the mound was slippery. Despite the difficulty 
the other woman encountered in climbing the snow mound, 
Kaplan contends this does not necessarily demonstrate that 
the mound was dangerous because the woman was elderly 
and may have needed assistance because of her age. 
Kaplan also notes that none of the other persons crossing 
the mound had difficulty. Finally, Kaplan contends she did 
not voluntarily confront the danger because she had no 
safe alternative to crossing the snow mound -- even if she 
had walked down the sidewalk to the gap by the fire 
hydrant, she would have had to walk back to the bus on a 
busy and icy street, in the traffic lane. 
 
In response, Exxon argues that under Pennsylvania law, 
the question of assumption of risk may be decided by the 
court when reasonable minds could not differ on the 
outcome. Exxon maintains the district court did not err 
when it decided the assumption of risk issue because 
Kaplan knew the mound was icy, knew that the older 
woman had trouble crossing the mound, and knew she had 
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a safe alternative path to the bus via the gap by the fire 
hydrant. 
 
Because we are sitting in diversity, we must predict how 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule. Surace v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Although it has addressed this issue on different occasions 
in recent years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
provided a definitive statement on the assumption of risk 
doctrine. In 1981, a plurality of the court sought to abolish 
the doctrine of assumption of risk "except where specifically 
preserved by statute; or in cases of express assumption of 
risk, or in cases brought under . . . a strict liability theory." 
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 
1198, 1209 (Pa. 1981). It adopted this position because it 
believed juries were confused by the doctrine and because 
it was bad public policy. The plurality also noted that, as a 
complete bar to recovery, the affirmative defense of 
assumption of risk frustrated the purpose of the state's 
comparative negligence statute, which was to allow 
plaintiffs to recover some damages despite some 
unreasonable or negligent conduct.1 The Rutter court 
observed that in most cases where assumption of risk is 
invoked to deny recovery, the court could reach the same 
result by holding the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty. 
 
Two years later a majority of the court breathed new life 
into the assumption of risk doctrine. In Carrender v. 
Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1983), the plaintiff parked her 
car on a sheet of ice on a parking lot even though the 
remainder of the parking lot was ice-free. The court held 
that because the danger was both obvious and known to 
the plaintiff, the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. 
The court stated it would reach the same result whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 7102(a), 
provides: "In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence 
resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the 
plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a 
recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such 
negligence 
was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or 
defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained 
by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributed to the plaintiff." 
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through analysis of the defendant's duty or application of 
the affirmative defense of assumption of risk. "When an 
invitee enters business premises, discovers dangerous 
conditions which are both obvious and avoidable, and 
nevertheless proceeds voluntarily to encounter them, the 
doctrine of assumption of risk operates merely as a 
counterpart to the possessor's lack of duty to protect the 
invitee from . . . risks." Id. at 125. 2 Furthermore, the court 
held that, although "the question of whether a danger was 
known or obvious is usually a question for the jury, the 
question may be decided by the court where reasonable 
minds could not differ as to the conclusion." Id. at 124. 
 
In 1993, the court once again considered the doctrine of 
assumption of risk, but this time was able to rule only as 
a plurality. In Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 1993), 
a three judge plurality noted that the status of the 
affirmative defense was unclear after Rutter and Carrender.3 
The plurality found the reasoning of the plurality in Rutter 
persuasive, holding that assumption of risk should be 
abolished "in essence" as an affirmative defense, except in 
cases where the defense is preserved by statute, is assumed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This analysis fails to recognize two differences between the 
assumption of risk doctrine and a duty analysis: (1) the burden of proof 
to establish duty lies with the plaintiff, Morena v. South Hills Health 
Sys., 
462 A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. 1983), while the burden of proof for the 
affirmative defense of assumption of risk lies with the defendant, Watson 
v. Zanotti Motor Co., 280 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); (2) 
assumption of risk is traditionally a jury question, while determination 
whether a defendant owed a plaintiff a duty is for the court to decide as 
a matter of law, Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1108 n.1 (Pa. 1993) 
("Whereas the questions of negligence and assumption of risk have 
traditionally been for the jury, the question of duty . . . is for the 
court."). 
On this second point, the Carrender court noted only that, though "the 
question of whether a danger was known or obvious is usually a 
question for the jury, the question may be decided by the court where 
reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion." 469 A.2d at 124. 
 
3. In fact, one justice dissented in Howell  for this reason, stating 
only, "I 
dissent. Until such time as this Court arrives at a clear-cut majority, we 
will continually muddy the waters in the sensitive areas of both 
comparative negligence and the assumption of risk, both of which are 
cornerstones of the negligence law in this Commonwealth." Howell, 620 
A.2d at 1115 (Zappala, J., dissenting). 
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expressly, or in strict liability cases. Id. at 1113 n.10. The 
Howell plurality decided, however, that because "it is 
desirable to preserve the public policy behind assumption 
of risk . . . but to the extent possible, remove the difficulties 
of application of the doctrine and the conflicts which exist 
with our comparative negligence statute, to the extent that 
an assumption of risk analysis is appropriate in any given 
case, it shall be applied by the court as part of the duty 
analysis, and not as part of the case to be determined by 
the jury." Id. at 1112-13. The court went on to hold that a 
"court may determine that no duty exists only if reasonable 
minds could not disagree that the plaintiff deliberately and 
with the awareness of specific risks inherent in the activity 
nonetheless engaged in the activity that produced his 
injury." Id. at 1113. 
 
Under both Carrender and Howell, the assumption of risk 
analysis is incorporated into the duty analysis. Even 
though the Howell court was unable to get majority support 
for this principle, this approach found in Carrender and 
Howell is our best prediction of how the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would analyze this case. Carrender is the 
most recent Supreme Court decision commanding a 
majority of justices. Therefore, it is Kaplan's burden to 
establish that Exxon had a duty here, and not Exxon's 
burden to prove Kaplan assumed the risk of her injury. 
Under Carrender, this issue goes to the jury unless 
reasonable minds could not disagree. Carrender, 469 A.2d 
at 124.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The approaches in Howell and Carrender are similar, except that 
Howell held the duty/assumption of risk issue is a question of law for 
the court: 
 
       [Our] approach preserves the public policy behind the [assumption 
       of risk] doctrine while at the same time alleviating the difficulty 
of 
       instructing a jury on voluntariness, knowledge, and scope of the 
       risk. 
 
       Under this approach the court may determine that no duty exists 
       only if reasonable minds could not disagree that the plaintiff 
       deliberately and with the awareness of specific risks inherent in 
the 
       activity nonetheless engaged in the activity that produced his 
injury. 
       Under those facts, the court would determine that the defendant, as 
       a matter of law, owed plaintiff no duty of care. 
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Exxon had no duty to Kaplan if she "discover[ed] 
dangerous conditions which [were] both obvious and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       If, on the other hand, the court is not able to make this 
       determination and a nonsuit is denied, then the case would proceed 
       and would be submitted to the jury on a comparative negligence 
       theory. Under this approach, . . . assumption of the risk would no 
       longer be part of the jury's deliberations or instructions. 
 
Howell, 620 A.2d at 1113. This approach has much to commend it. But 
Howell was only a plurality ruling and therefore does not displace the 
prior majority ruling in Carrender that the duty/assumption of risk issue 
goes to the jury. Williams v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 687 
A.2d 428, 483 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (plurality opinion of state supreme 
court not binding precedent). 
 
Nonetheless, when a jury applies the law as stated in Carrender and 
decides defendant owed a duty to plaintiff, we assume it must thereafter 
(as explained in Howell) apply the comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 7102(a). See Carrender, 469 A.2d at 125 (recognizing 
the overlap between the doctrines of assumption of risk and comparative 
negligence, and stating, "For fault to be apportioned under the 
comparative negligence statute, there must be . . . a breach of duty by 
the defendant to the plaintiff . . . . Whatever the effect of the adoption 
of a system of comparative fault on the defense of assumption of risk 
where that defense overlaps and coincides with contributory negligence, 
the adoption of such a system has no effect where, as here, the legal 
consequence of the invitee's assumption of a known and avoidable risk 
is that the possessor of land is relieved of a duty of care to the 
invitee."). 
As the Civil Instructions Subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions noted, 
Pennsylvania courts have held the "Comparative Negligence Act would 
still apply where the underlying conduct of a plaintiff amounted to 
negligence," even though it may not have amounted to the "more 
culpable" conduct of actual assumption of risk. Pennsylvania Suggested 
Standard Civil Jury Instructions S 3.03A (Subcommittee Note on 
Assumption of Risk) (1991) (citing Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 542 A.2d 
525 (1988)). See also Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence S9-4(b), 
at n.100 (3d ed. Supp. 1996). 
 
We note this case would appear to be a good example of the type of 
assumption of risk which is better viewed as contributory negligence. 
The plaintiff has exposed herself to risk of future harm but has not 
consented to relieve the defendant of a future duty to act with 
reasonable care. Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 485 (W. Page Keeton ed., 
5th ed. 1984). In cases like this one, it would appear that the 
comparative negligence approach is the better one. 
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avoidable, and nevertheless proceed[ed] voluntarily to 
encounter them." Carrender, 469 A.2d at 125. We agree 
with the district court that the snow mound was a known 
and obvious risk. But we do not agree that Kaplan acted 
voluntarily as a matter of law when she crossed over the 
snow mound. A plaintiff voluntarily confronts a danger only 
where there is a real "choice" involved, Howell, 620 A.2d at 
1112, i.e. a safe alternative to encountering the risk. 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts S 68, at 490-91 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (no assumption of risk where 
plaintiff has "no reasonable alternative."). The district court 
held there was such a safe alternative here, relying on its 
view that "[i]t was [Kaplan's] own idea to cross there as 
opposed to at a nearby, safe location." Kaplan, 926 F. 
Supp. at 62. But a jury could find there was no safe 
alternative route to the bus, because entering the street by 
the fire hydrant would have required Kaplan to walk a 
distance back towards the bus stop in an icy street with 
traffic. Moreover, to avoid having to stand in the street (its 
roadway narrowed by ice and snow), she would have had to 
visualize the arriving bus and time her round-about 
traverse to the bus stop with some precision. Indeed, 
Kaplan testified at her deposition that she thought the bus 
would leave without her if she walked away from the bus 
stop towards the hydrant. If Kaplan had no reasonable 
alternative to climbing the snow mound, then a jury could 
find she did not act voluntarily and therefore did not 
assume the risk of injury. 
 
Because reasonable minds could disagree whether 
Kaplan's actions were truly voluntary, we will vacate the 
grant of summary judgment on this ground. 
 
B. Proximate Causation 
 
Defendants contend we should affirm nonetheless 
because Kaplan failed to prove Exxon's alleged negligence 
proximately caused her injures. We may consider this 
argument as an alternative ground to affirm. United States 
v. Taylor, 98 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 1996) (appellee may 
assert any ground in support of the judgment below) (citing 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397 n.16 (1979)), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1016 (1997). 
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The district court recognized that all eyewitnesses 
(including Kaplan) testified the snow mound "was between 
the bus stop sign and the bus" and that some eyewitnesses 
testified "the mound was in the street." Kaplan, 926 F. 
Supp. at 61. But the court denied summary judgment for 
Exxon, holding there is an issue of fact as to "where the 
mound of snow began or where its top was." Id. 
 
Defendants contend it is irrelevant "where the mound of 
snow began or where its top was," because deposition 
testimony established that Kaplan slipped in the street. 
Kaplan testified at her deposition that she had climbed to 
the top of the mound of ice and snow when she fell. She 
ended up in the street, inches away from the bus. A 
witness, Lindsay Henderson, testified that Kaplan had 
reached the top of the mound, which was in the street, 
when she slipped. Another witness, Ronald Woodward, 
testified that Kaplan was at the top of the snowbank when 
she started to fall and that she fell in the street. 
 
Defendants contend this proves as a matter of law that 
Exxon's alleged negligence did not cause her injuries.5 But 
Kaplan maintains there is an issue of fact "whether the 
snow mound existed on the sidewalk as well as the street 
and whether the top of the mound was on the sidewalk or 
in the street." Id. She points out there is testimony the 
snow mound "actually began at the bus stop sign, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Defendants point to Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 
69 (3d Cir. 1996). In Fedorczyk, plaintiff slipped and injured herself in 
a bathtub on a cruise ship. She sued the cruise line for negligently 
placing non-slip abrasive strips too far apart in the bathtub. We affirmed 
the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants because 
plaintiff could not prove "she was standing between the strips at the time 
of the accident." Id. at 75. Defendants contend that, under Fedorczyk, 
judgement must be entered against Kaplan because she failed to meet 
her burden to prove she was standing on the sidewalk, and not the 
street, at the time of her fall. 
 
We disagree. In Fedorczyk, which applied New Jersey law, id. at 73, 
the exact location of plaintiff's feet at the time of her fall was 
determinative on the issue of causation; had she been standing on the 
abrasive strips, her fall could not have been caused by negligent 
overspacing. But the exact location of Kaplan's fall does not answer the 
causation question here. 
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was on the sidewalk, and then continued into the street." 
Id. 
 
Although the issue is close, like the district court we 
believe there remains an issue of fact whether Exxon's 
negligence was a substantial factor in causing Kaplan's 
injuries. See Trude v. Martin, 660 A.2d 626, 633 (Pa. Super. 
1995) (upholding jury verdict of liability against one who 
maintains premises, where invitee was sitting on a brick 
wall and was pushed, which dislodged a loose capstone on 
the wall causing the invitee to fall to the ground. Court held 
defendant's negligent maintenance of the capstone was a 
"substantial factor" in causing invitee's injuries.), appeal 
granted in part on unrelated grounds, 672 A.2d 279 (Pa. 
1996). 
 
C. Third-Party Defendants 
 
The district court granted summary judgment to the 
third-party defendants "upon consideration of the[ir] 
Motion[s] for Summary Judgment . . . and, in light of this 
Court's Grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Exxon 
Corp." The third-party defendants contend we should affirm 
summary judgment in their favor even if we reverse the 
grant of summary judgment to Exxon. 
 
The third-party defendants maintain summary judgment 
in their favor is warranted because Exxon failed to present 
any evidence that Anderson or Morrissey plowed the area of 
Levick Street and Oxford Avenue, created the snow mound 
in question, or that the snow mound was negligently 
created. But we will not reach the merits of the third-party 
defendants' motions where the district court did not.6 We 
will reverse and remand the grant of summary judgment to 
the third party defendants and direct the district court to 
consider their motion on the merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The third-party defendants contend the district court did reach the 
merits, as evidenced by its order stating, "upon consideration of the 
[third-party defendants'] Motion[s] for Summary Judgment." But this 
statement does not indicate the district court considered the merits of 
their motions. The only reason the district court gave for granting 
summary judgment was that it did so in light of its grant of summary 
judgment to Exxon. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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